# The Philosophers’ “Reason” – The way philosophers use the word “reason” is deeply misleading

- Author: Paul Csavdari
- Site: MEKORAH
- Content type: Article
- Editorial status: Current position
- Canonical URL: https://paulcsavdari.blog/2026/07/15/the-philosophers-reason-the-way-philosophers-use-the-word-reason-is-deeply-misleading/
- Published: 2026-07-15T00:31:58+02:00
- Last revised: 2026-07-15T00:35:20+02:00

## Subject Collections

- [Philosophy and Religion](https://paulcsavdari.blog/ai/category/philosophy-and-religion.md): Articles examining the relationship between Greek philosophy, religious doctrine, biblical interpretation, and the historical development of theology. Canonical category page: https://paulcsavdari.blog/category/philosophy-and-religion/

## Official Summary

Throughout history, philosophy has managed to establish itself as the discipline that claims to investigate and define the deepest truths of existence. One of its central tools is the concept of “REASON.” Yet herein lies a fundamental problem: when philosophers use the word “reason,” they…

## Full Text

Throughout history, philosophy has managed to establish itself as the discipline that claims to investigate and define the deepest truths of existence. One of its central tools is the concept of “REASON.” Yet herein lies a fundamental problem: when philosophers use the word “reason,” they are being misleading, because what they mean has nothing whatsoever to do with what ordinary people understand by that same term. In this piece we will examine how philosophers employ the word “reason” in a way that creates confusion, giving the false impression that their thinking is in direct continuity with the rationality of the common man; when in reality, the two are entirely different things.

**The reason of the common man: a simple and universal capacity**

For the ordinary person, reason is something natural and accessible. It is the ability to distinguish between good and evil, to make logical choices in everyday life, and to act on the basis of common sense. This native rationality helps every human being navigate the concrete world, fulfil their moral duties, and grasp the essential truths of life.
This reason is simple and practical. The ordinary person has no need of complicated theories or abstract concepts in order to make the right decision. For example, when someone chooses to tell the truth instead of lying, that choice rests on a fundamental moral instinct sustained by natural rationality. The common man lives by these straightforward principles, guided by conscience, and feels no need to philosophise or over-complicate things in order to know what is right and what is wrong.

**Philosophers’ “REASON”: a terminological trap**

Philosophers, on the other hand, have developed a completely different concept that they still call “REASON,” but which has nothing to do with the reason of the ordinary person. Here lies the first great problem: using the same word creates the false impression that philosophers are working with the same cognitive tools as everyone else, when in fact they employ an abstract form of reason that is inaccessible to the vast majority of people.

This philosophical “REASON” is a complex theoretical construct, often lacking any direct connection to everyday reality. Philosophers claim that through this kind of reason they can discover higher, universal truths that the ordinary person cannot reach. The problem arises when they use the very same term the common man uses; “reason”; yet give it an entirely different meaning without ever clarifying the difference.

In today’s public communication (popular books, podcasts, lectures, social media), the explicit warning “when I say ‘reason’ I am not talking about the common sense you possess” is absent in roughly 90–95 % of cases. Recent examples: Yuval Noah Harari, Sam Harris, Peter Singer, Steven Pinker, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Alex O’Connor; none of them opens with a clear statement such as “caution: I am playing an entirely different game from ordinary reason.” On the contrary, they all use phrases like “reason shows us that…,” “any rational person accepts that…,” fully aware that the audience will understand “common sense.”

**The confusion created by using the same term**

Through this linguistic manoeuvre, philosophers suggest that the truths they reach with their philosophical REASON are in perfect continuity with what any ordinary person would understand by their native reason. This is the great sleight-of-hand. Philosophers present their complicated theories as the fruit of the very same reason the common man uses when making simple moral decisions. In doing so, they create the impression that there is harmony between what they say and what any rational person might say, when in truth they are operating in a completely different dimension of thought.

The ordinary person can thus be misled into believing that philosophy is a natural extension of his own rational capacity, when in reality philosophers are talking about something entirely different. This confusion is not a mere accidental misunderstanding; it is the direct consequence of the fact that philosophers deliberately choose to use the same term for two radically different realities.

There does, however, exist a small minority (5–10 %) who are perfectly transparent and state from the outset: “Caution: I am playing a different game.” Historical examples: Kant in the preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger, formal logicians, certain highly technical analytic philosophers, Thomas Nagel in some of his texts. These are the exceptions that prove the rule; and they are extremely rarely given media exposure precisely because they shatter the illusion of continuity.

**Why don’t philosophers simply change the term?**

One crucial point is this: if philosophers decided to call what they do something else; if, for instance, they named their intellectual process with a completely new and different term such as “XSDGASEWDSS”; it would immediately become obvious to everyone that what they do is fundamentally different from the natural reason of the ordinary person. A clear line would be drawn between philosophical thought and ordinary thought, and people would understand that we are not dealing with the same kind of reasoning at all.

Yet by continuing to use the same term, philosophers maintain an ambiguity that allows them to appear connected to the natural reason of the common man, when in fact they are using a completely different method. Instead of clarifying the distinction, they choose to preserve the confusion. This is the very essence of the sleight-of-hand: they promote their philosophical truths as products of the same reason we all use, when in reality they are the outcome of an isolated, abstract, and complicated intellectual process.

In current practice, 90–95 % of the philosophers who reach the wider public systematically choose to maintain this confusion. The 5–10 % who clearly say “this is not the same thing” do exist, but they are almost invisible in the broader public sphere.

**The consequences of the confusion: the estrangement of philosophy from ordinary people**

This deliberately created confusion between natural reason and philosophical REASON leads to a widening gulf between philosophers and ordinary people. Philosophers appear to speak the same language as the rest of us, yet in reality they are using a different code altogether. Consequently, those who have not been initiated into philosophical thinking are led to believe that philosophical theories and concepts are the product of a kind of thinking just as accessible as their own reason. In truth, the “truths” promoted by philosophers are the result of a type of thinking that has nothing to do with natural reason; rather, it is an artificial, complicated form of thought, often disconnected from practical reality.

Instead of being transparent and clearly making this distinction, philosophers prefer to keep the terminological confusion alive, thereby consolidating their position as “possessors of truth,” while the ordinary person is left believing that what philosophers say is compatible with his own reason.

**Conclusion**

The difference between the reason of the common man and what philosophers call “REASON” is immense, even if it is not always obvious because the same term is used for two completely different things. If this difference were clarified and philosophers used a different term to describe their intellectual process, it would be instantly clear that a chasm separates natural reason from philosophical REASON; a chasm that cannot be bridged. Yet by continuing to use the same word, philosophers maintain the illusion of continuity between their thinking and that of the ordinary person, thereby misleading him. This is the very essence of the philosophical sleight-of-hand.

In today’s public arena (2020–2025), nine out of ten intellectuals who declare “reason shows us that…” are in fact selling a highly controversial technical construct packaged as obvious common sense. The ordinary person has every right to be angry. And he has every right to demand: “Stop telling me you think the same way I do when you are thinking in an entirely different way.”

## Attribution

The interpretations and conclusions belong to Paul Csavdari. The AI-generated voice is the narrator, not the author.

© Paul Csavdari. All rights reserved.